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DE NOVO DENIED:  DISTRICT COURTS’ 
RELIANCE ON CAMARDO IS CLEAR ERROR 
Brian J. Levy* 
 
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendations 
on a dispositive motion, a district court must determine which parts of the 
report and recommendations are reviewed de novo.  Dicta in a 1992 
Western District of New York case, Camardo v. General Motors Hourly-
Rate Employees Pension Plan,1 states that it is “improper for an objecting 
party to. . . rehash[]. . . the same arguments and positions taken in the 
original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge.”2  This dicta has been 
adopted by numerous district courts in New York—particularly the 
Southern and Northern Districts—as well as district courts outside the 
Second Circuit.3  These courts have used this dicta for the proposition that a 
district court need not perform a de novo review of arguments that a party 
makes in its objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendations 
if that argument was already considered by the magistrate judge.  When this 
dicta is used to deny such review, it deprives litigants of statutory and, 
possibly, constitutional rights. 
It is undisputed that a district judge must “make a de novo determination 
of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed 
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”4  Whether an 
objection gets de novo review is very important because parts of a 
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that are not objected to may 
be either (1) approved if they free of clear error5 or (2) not reviewed at all.6 
 
*  Author of 20 U.S.C. § 1406(b), 62 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).  Thanks to Judges 
Leonard B. Sand, Jesse M. Furman, and Analisa Torres, from whom I learned so much. 
 1. 806 F. Supp. 380, 381–82 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 2. Id. at 382. 
 3. See, e.g., Nelson v. Astrue, No. CV-12-06-BLG-RFC-CSO, 2012 WL 5987135, at 
*1 n.1 (D. Mont. Nov. 29, 2012); Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 
3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) (“[A] party may serve and file 
specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. . . .  The district 
judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been 
properly objected to.”). 
 5. See, e.g., McGrigs v. Killian, No. 08 Civ. 6238(RMB)(DF), 2009 WL 3762201, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2009) (“The Court may adopt any portions of a magistrate judge’s 
report to which no objections have been made and which are not clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law.”). 
 6. See Hounddog Prods., L.L.C. v. Empire Film Grp., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 619, 623–
24 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985)); see also Thomas, 474 
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Numerous district courts, especially in New York, rely on the dicta in 
Camardo to hold that an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendations that “merely rehashes” an argument made before a 
magistrate judge is reviewed for clear error.7  In this case, “clear error” 
should not be the standard of review; rather, “clear error” aptly describes 
the Camardo dicta. 
Camardo correctly stated that “objections to a Report and 
Recommendation are to be specific and are to address only those portions 
of the proposed findings to which the party objects.”8  However, Camardo 
went off the rails when it asserted: 
It is improper for an objecting party to attempt to relitigate the entire 
content of the hearing before the Magistrate Judge by submitting papers to 
a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the same 
arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the 
Magistrate Judge.9 
For this conclusion, Camardo cited two cases, McCarthy v. Manson10 
and Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.11  However, these two cases 
do not state that a litigant may not “rehash” arguments.  Rather, they merely 
explain that the purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act12 was to decrease 
the workload of district courts.13  While it is obvious that an “objection” 
 
U.S. at 149 (“The statute does not on its face require any review at all, by either the district 
court or the court of appeals, of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Rivera v. Ercole, No. 09 Civ. 5547(DAB), 2013 WL 4414863, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013) (citing Sidney v. Caron, No. 9:09-CV-1326(GTS/ATB), 2012 WL 
4383092, at *3 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), a case that cites Camardo).  In Vega v. Artuz, 
the court quoted Camardo, cited three other cases that, in turn, cite Camardo, and cited one 
case in which the petitioner “merely assert[ed] a general objection.” Vega v. Artuz, No. 
97Civ.3775LTSJCF, 2002 WL 31174466, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002); see also 
Moskowitz v. La Suisse, Societe D’Assurances Sur la Vie, 282 F.R.D. 54, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (quoting Vega and Camardo to determine the standard of review); Combier v. New 
York, No. 1:09-cv-05314(RJH)(FM), 2010 WL 3835030, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010) 
(same). 
 8. Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 381–82.  Camardo alleged that its reasoning was based on 
the “the plain meaning” of Rule 30(a)(3) of the Local Rules for the United States District 
Court for the Western District of New York rather than Rule 72 or § 636(b)(1). Id. at 381.  
Despite this disclaimer, Camardo was clearly construing Rule 72 and § 636(b)(1).  First, 
Camardo supports its conclusion with policy arguments, which rely on the purpose of 28 
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See infra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.  Second, the Local Civil 
Rule is hardly different from the Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Finally, 
to the extent Camardo only applies the Local Civil Rule rather than § 636 and Rule 72, no 
other court should take it as persuasive precedent, but, as discussed above, they have.  
Therefore, it is clear that Camardo was interpreting § 636 and Rule 72, even though it claims 
not to have been doing so. 
 9. Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 382. 
 10. 554 F. Supp. 1275, 1286 (D. Conn. 1982), aff’d, 714 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 11. 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1980). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–
639 (2006)). 
 13. See Park Motor Mart, 616 F.2d at 605 (“The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act 
is to relieve courts of unnecessary work.”); McCarthy, 554 F. Supp. at 1286 (“The goal of 
the federal statute providing for the assignment of cases to magistrates is to ‘increas[e] the 
overall efficiency of the federal judiciary,’ while preserving for litigants the opportunity to 
have their claims heard by a district judge.” (alteration in original) (quoting Nettles v. 
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that disagrees with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation without 
explaining why would not be “specific” enough to secure de novo review 
under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,14 an objection that 
makes the same arguments that were made before the magistrate judge is 
not necessarily or even likely to be nonspecific.  Indeed, this dicta in 
Camardo is so transparently weak that even after explaining its objection to 
de novo review, the Camardo court then conducted de novo review.15 
Camardo’s reading of Rule 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636 that disentitles a 
party to de novo review when that party raises the same arguments in its 
objections that it raised before the magistrate judge is wrong for at least five 
reasons: 
1. The clear text of Rule 72 and § 636 only require specific and timely 
objections.  No judicial gloss should be permitted to change the 
statutory standard of review. 
2. The Second Circuit has never adopted the Camardo dicta and 
therefore district courts are not required to follow it. 
3. Instead, the Second Circuit has recognized the rule that district 
courts need not consider arguments that a party did not raise before 
the magistrate judge.  If a district court does not need to consider 
arguments that were not raised and reviews arguments already raised 
under a clearly erroneous standard, de novo review would be very 
difficult for a party to obtain. 
4. To the extent that the Camardo dicta deprives a party of an Article 
III tribunal, it may be unconstitutional. 
5. Finally, as noted above, the Camardo dicta is based on a policy 
argument that the Federal Magistrates Act favors efficiency.  This is 
an awfully slender reed on which to rest its conclusion because the 
Act as a whole can generate efficiencies even if parties are free to 
raise the same arguments in their objections and receive de novo 
review. 
First, the clear text of § 636 and Rule 72 only require “specific,” timely, 
and “proper[]” objections.  Section 636(b)(1) reads: 
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve 
and file written objections to such proposed findings and 
recommendations as provided by rules of court.  A judge of the court shall 
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified 
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.16 
 
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)) (citing Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 
F.2d 689, 692–93 (2d Cir. 1978))); see also Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 382 (quoting 
McCarthy and Park Motor Mart for the proposition that the purpose of the Federal 
Magistrates Act was to increase efficiency and decrease work). 
 14. See, e.g., Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 15. Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 382. 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
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As the Third Circuit recently held, “the plain language of § 636(b)(1) . . . 
make[s] clear” that objections previously made to the district court should 
be reviewed de novo.17 
As is relevant, Rule 72 is only different from § 636 in that Rule 72 
requires the objections be “specific” and de novo review be given only for 
the parts of the disposition that have been “properly objected to.”18  The 
requirement of specificity should not force a party to object only to certain 
parts of a report and recommendation, but rather should ensure that the 
district court can distinguish which parts are objected to—and therefore are 
reviewed de novo—and which are the remainder, reviewed for clear error.19  
The requirement that the objections be “proper” would be a strange way for 
the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress to require that parties advance 
arguments other than those they raised before the magistrate judge. 
Second, the Second Circuit has never adopted the Camardo dicta and 
therefore district courts are not required to follow it.  The district court 
memoranda that cite the Camardo dicta never cite a Second Circuit opinion 
in support of it.20  Indeed, the Second Circuit recently noted without 
comment that a district court entertained a rehashing of arguments de 
novo,21 strongly suggesting that it saw that standard of review as 
appropriate.  Moreover, the Second Circuit regularly states, like the statute 
and rule, that any specific objections require de novo review.22 
 
 17. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011).  Brown abrogated a district court 
case, Morgan v. Astrue, that relied on several cases, including at least one that relied on the 
Camardo dicta. See id. at 195 (stating that Morgan “is not correct”); Morgan v. Astrue, No. 
08-2133, 2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009) (citing State St. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 246 F. Supp. 2d 231, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing 
Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 381–82)), abrogated by Brown, 649 F.3d at 193. 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). 
 19. See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3070.1 
(2d ed. 1997) (“The rule adds that the objections must be ‘specific’ so as to conform to the 
statute’s requirement that the judge review those portions of the proposed findings or 
recommendations to which objection is made.”); see also supra notes 5–6 and accompanying 
text (explaining that the parts of a report and recommendations objected to are reviewed de 
novo while parts not objected to are reviewed for clear error or not at all). 
 20. See, e.g., Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 381–82; Moskowitz v. La Suisse, Societe 
D’Assurances Sur la Vie, 282 F.R.D. 54, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Combier v. New York, No. 
1:09-cv-05314(RJH)(FM), 2010 WL 3835030, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010); Vega v. Artuz, 
No. 97Civ.3775LTSJCF, 2002 WL 31174466, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002). 
 21. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 
119 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Mountain Valley filed written objections to the entire R & R making 
essentially the same arguments it had presented to the magistrate judge.  Upon de novo 
review, the district court adopted the R & R in its entirety and without further written 
analysis.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Morris v. Local 804, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 167 F. App’x 230, 232 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (summary order) (“If the parties timely exercise their right to object to those 
findings, the district court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report and 
recommendation to which the party objects.” (citing Grassia v. Scully, 892 F. 2d 16, 19 (2d 
Cir. 1989), and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b))); Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Magistrate Judge’s Report-Recommendation was subject 
to de novo review as to those issues upon which the parties raised objections.”); Beyah v. 
Walker, No. 96-2990, 1997 WL 786375, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (unpublished table 
decision) (“Once objections are filed, the district court conducts a de novo review with 
respect to the disputed issues.”). 
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Third, the Second Circuit has recognized what is essentially the opposite 
rule:  that district courts need not consider arguments that a party did not 
raise before the magistrate judge.23  Under such a standard, parties are 
limited to discussing what would be forbidden under the Camardo dicta:  
the “same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to 
the Magistrate Judge.”24  Some district courts hold both contradictory 
positions—Camardo’s no rehashing and the Second Circuit’s waiver of 
argument not raised before the magistrate judge—in the same case.25  If a 
district court need not consider arguments that were not raised—and 
reviews arguments already raised—under a clearly erroneous standard, de 
novo review becomes very difficult to obtain.  As the Third Circuit 
explained, “any appeal to a district court based on an objection to a 
Magistrate Judge’s order will ‘rehash arguments presented to and 
considered by’ the Magistrate Judge.  That is—by definition—the very 
nature of ‘review.’”26 
Fourth, to the extent that the Camardo dicta deprives a party of an Article 
III tribunal, it may run afoul of the construction of § 636 necessary to avoid 
constitutional problems.  Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that “[g]iven 
the possible constitutional implications of delegating Article III judges’ 
duties to magistrate judges, we have generally ‘avoided constitutional 
issues in this area by construing the Federal Magistrates Act narrowly in 
light of its structure and purpose.’”27  Article III values28 suggest that the 
statute should be construed to allow such review.  This is especially true 
when, for instance, a pro se petitioner would have no reason to expect 
Camardo’s misguided dicta to contravene § 636’s standard of review, and 
his or her habeas petition is then denied de novo review by an Article III 
 
 23. See McEachin v. Walker, 147 F. App’x 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order) 
(holding it was not an abuse of discretion to ignore evidence submitted after the report and 
recommendation); Walker v. Stinson, No. 99-0054, 2000 WL 232295, at *2 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision) (holding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to consider” a legal argument that defendants “failed to raise” before the magistrate 
judge); see also Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 894 F.2d 36, 41 
n.3 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Pan Am had no right to present further testimony when it offered no 
justification for not offering the testimony at the hearing before the magistrate.”). But see 
Hynes, 143 F.3d at 655–56 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in 
considering evidence submitted for the first time in support of an objection). 
 24. Camardo, 806 F. Supp. at 382. 
 25. See, e.g., Rivera v. Ercole, No. 09 Civ. 5547(DAB), 2013 WL 4414863, at *1–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013); Gallagher v. Astrue, No. 11-Civ159MAT, 2013 WL 2528176, at 
*2–3 (W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2013); Adamdsu v. Ngati, No. 05-CV-2585 (RRM)(LB), 2012 
WL 3930386, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2012); White v. Drake, No. 9:10-CV-1034 
(GTS/DRH), 2011 WL 4478921, at *4 n.4, *8 n.14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011); cf. Garcia v. 
Furnia, No. 9:12-CV-0924 (GTS/ATB), 2013 WL 3243952, at *2 n.4, *3 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. June 
26, 2013); United Cent. Bank v. Shree Ganesh Props., LLC, No. 10 CV 8116(VB), 2013 WL 
1703875, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2013). 
 26. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 27. Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re 
United States, 10 F.3d 931, 934 n.4 (2d Cir.1993)). 
 28. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980). 
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judge.29  Without a Second Circuit or Supreme Court holding construing 
§ 636 to require such limited de novo review, district courts should be wary 
of constructions of § 636 that offer more “efficiency” by limiting Article III 
review.30 
Fifth and finally, as noted above, the Camardo dicta is based on a policy 
argument that the Federal Magistrates Act favors efficiency.  This is an 
insufficient reason to read § 636 to require new arguments for de novo 
review because § 636 can increase efficiency even if, in some cases, parties 
are entitled to de novo review and choose to relitigate every issue.  For 
example, pretrial matters in those same cases would not be reviewed de 
novo.31  Even where de novo review is required, the district court need not 
hold a hearing,32 and the district court has the benefit of a well-reasoned 
opinion on the matter from an excellent magistrate judge.33  Moreover, 
merely requiring a party to object to an unfavorable decision by a 
magistrate judge decreases the likelihood that that party will proceed.  
Under Camardo’s reasoning, one would expect litigants to appeal every 
summary judgment issued by a district court simply because the losing 
party has a right to de novo review of such rulings.34 
For the above reasons, courts should reject the Camardo dicta and openly 
disagree with any party that cites it or its progeny for the proposition that a 
party may not “rehash” arguments.  A party objecting to a magistrate 
judge’s report and recommendation need not provide new arguments in 
order to obtain de novo review of its objections. 
 
 
 29. See, e.g., Rivera, 2013 WL 4414863, at *1–3 (concluding that a pro se petitioner’s 
three objections were all attempts to relitigate issues brought before the magistrate judge and 
denying petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under a clear error standard, allegedly 
“ the appropriate level of review”). 
 30. Cf. Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Thus, the only conceivable 
danger of a ‘threat’ to the ‘independence’ of the magistrate comes from within, rather than 
without, the judicial department.” (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring))). 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 32. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 673–84. 
 33. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 894 F.2d 36, 40–41 n.3 
(2d Cir. 1990) (stating that “reliance on [a] magistrate’s recommendation is within [the] 
discretion of [a] district court” on de novo review (citing Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674–76)); see 
also, e.g., Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 279 F.R.D. 245, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (referring to “our 
excellent magistrate judges” in the Southern District of New York). 
 34. See, e.g., Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We 
review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards 
that govern the district court’s consideration of the motion.”). 
